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Essay
WORSHIPPING AT THE ALTAR OF TECHNIQUE: MANIC
AGGRESSIVE MEDICINE AND LAW*
CHARLEs R. DISALvo**

"We now act as if we really believe that disease, aging, and death are
unnaturalacts and all things are remediable. '

O

I.

INTRODUCTION

N October 13, 1993, in a hospital in Fairfax, Virginia, Contrenia Harrell gave birth to a girl who would be known to the
world only as "Baby K." What marked Contrenia's daughter as different was that she was born without a cerebrum. For whatever period of time her four-and-a-half pound body would live, Baby K
would be incapable of any consciousness, any cognition. She would
never speak a word nor hear a sound. She was alive only because
she had a brain stem, which allowed her body to engage in reflex
actions and involuntary functions.
When Baby K had difficulty breathing at birth, the doctors at
Fairfax Hospital turned to a mechanical ventilator to sustain her
breathing while they confirmed their diagnosis and talked to the
child's mother.
The typical result of such parent-physician conversations is an
agreement not to prolong the infant's dying, but instead to provide
nutrition, hydration and warmth for the few days such infants live.
Virtually all physicians and parents see no point in more. Indeed,
Baby K's doctors as well as a specially appointed panel of the hospital's ethics committee recommended that further treatment not be
given. 2 Contrenia Harrell, however, knew about mechanical ventilation and she demanded that whenever her daughter needed ventilation she should receive it.
* I owe the phrase "manic aggressive medicine" to Professor William E. May.

See William E. May, When All Is Said and Done, COMMONWEAL, Oct. 22, 1993, at 26.
** Woodrow A. Potesta Professor of Law, West Virginia University College of
Law. ©Copyright, 1995.
1. Faith T. Fitzgerald, The Tyranny of Health, 331 NEw ENG. J. MED. 196, 197
(1994).
2. Linda Greenhouse, HospitalAppeals Ruling on TreatingBaby Born With Most
of Brain Gone, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 23, 1993, at 10-A, col. 4.
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The hospital tried to transfer Baby K to another hospital. Predictably, no other hospital would take her. The hospital kept her
until, seven weeks after her birth, she was able to tolerate a transfer
to a pediatric nursing facility. Baby K's mother agreed to the transfer but only on the condition that the hospital take the child back
should she experience respiratory distress.
That move provided only a brief respite for the hospital.
Thereafter, Baby K was brought back to the hospital and put on the
mechanical ventilator whenever her breathing began to fail. Soon
the hospital grew tired of this; it asked the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Virginia to declare it had no obligation to continue ventilation for an anencephalic baby.3 Both the
district court, and the United States Court of Appeals for the
4
Fourth Circuit to which the hospital appealed, ruled against it.
The United States Supreme Court refused to hear the case. 5 The
cycle of transporting the child from the nursing home to the hospital for ventilation and then back to the nursing home was to con6
tinue for the next two-and-a-half years.
Finally, on April 5, 1995, Baby K succumbed to a cardiac arrest.
3. The formal term for children born without cerebrums. The trial court
found:
Anencephaly is a congenital defect in which the brain stem is present but
the cerebral cortex is rudimentary or absent. There is no treatment that
will cure, correct, or ameliorate anencephaly. Baby K is permanently unconscious and cannot hear or see. Lacking a cerebral function, Baby K
does not feel pain. Baby K has brain stem functions primarily limited to
reflex actions such as feeding reflexes (rooting, sucking, swallowing), respiratory reflexes (breathing, coughing), and reflexive responses to
sound or touch. Baby K has a normal heart rate, blood pressure, liver
function, digestion, kidney function, and bladder function and has
gained weight since her birth. Most anencephalic infants die within days
of birth.
In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1025 (E.D. Va. 1993), aff'd, 16 F.3d 590 (4th Cir.),
cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
4. Id. at 1026. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of
Virginia ruled that refusing Baby K the ventilator would violate the Americans with
Disabilities Act of 1990, 42 U.S.C. §§ 12101-12213 (1988 & Supp. V 1993), the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. § 794 (1994), and the Emergency Treatment
and Active Labor Act (EMTALA), 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1026-29. The district court declined to rule on the question of whether refusing ventilator services would violate the Child Abuse Prevention and Treatment Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 5101-5106h (1988 & Supp. V 1993) or the
statutes and common law of Virginia. Baby K 832 F. Supp. at 1029. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit ruled only that refusal would violate
EMTALA; it declined to address the remaining questions. 16 F.3d at 596.
5. In re Baby K, 115 S. Ct. 91 (1994).
6. From the time of her birth to October 7, 1994, Baby K was put on the
ventilator six times. Marylou Tousignant & William Miller, Baby K's Mother Gives
Her the Prayer That Many Deny She Has, WASH. PosT, Oct. 7, 1994, at Al.
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Only then were all the parties to this story-the hospital, the
mother, the child, her doctors and the courts-free from the grip
of the mechanical ventilator.
The machine that kept Baby K's body breathing, the machine
that was a frequent and dominating bedside presence, is a symbol
of the technology before which American society, medicine and law
genuflect with a mixture of fervor and awe. For Americans, technology, especially medical technology, is the alpha and the omega,
the beginning and the end.
Why?
Why do Americans so readily embrace CPR, intubation, EKGs,
angioplasty, the coronary by-pass, lithotripsy, MRI and CAT scans?
Why do Americans demand that there be a technological test for
every ailment-and that they get unambiguous responses?
Why must every American home have a VCR, a computer and a
cordless telephone?
Indeed, why did Americans react to the tragedy of the hightech Gulf War, which killed upwards of 100,000 people, as if it were
a video game?
In 1954, a little-known French theorist, Jacques Ellul, predicted
we would be asking these questions when he published his controversial book, La Technique ou l'enjeu du siecle.7 In it Ellul said: "No
social, human, or spiritual fact is so important as the fact of technique in the modem world. And yet no subject is so little
understood."8
Now, more than forty years after Ellul wrote these words and
more than thirty years after their appearance in the American publication of the English translation, entitled The Technological Society,
the importance of "la technique"9 to an explanation of our modem
condition remains terribly underestimated. Yet the role of technology in the creation of a world that grows more inhospitable to humanity each day has become more virulent, more malignant than
ever.
Ellul warned us that technology, which he defined as the one
7. Literally, Technique or the Stake of the Century. A student of Ellul, Professor
Darrel J. Fasching, states that Ellul's "analysis of the technological society and his
own theological response represent a ground-breaking milestone in the history of
modern theology." DARREL J. FASCHING, THE THOUGHT OF JACQUES ELLUL Vii
(1981).
8. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY 3 (1964).
9. One might translate Ellul's "a technique" in English as "technology." For
a discussion of the terms "technique" and "technology" as used by Ellul, see infra
note 14. Both terms will be used here depending on the context....
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most rational and efficient means of accomplishing any task,
presses human value out of any enterprise to which it is applied.
Thus, the automobile displaced walking and gave us smog, television displaced conversation and contributed to the destruction of
family life,' 0 the telephone displaced correspondence and gave us
the answering machine." Technology displaces the pursuit of the
human with the pursuit of the efficient.
Medicine and law simply reflect the values of the larger society
in which they are practiced. Thus, the ill effects of technology are
no less pernicious in these fields than they are elsewhere in society.
Using medical and legal technique as illustrative of the greater
problem, I ask in this essay: From what sources does technique
draw its power? Can society, law and medicine overcome technique? Can people wrest control of their lives from its dominion?
In this essay I first seek to draw attention to the inherent power
of technology, to human weakness for technology, and to the dehumanizing effects of technology. In aid of this effort, I synthesize the
salient points of whatJacques Ellul and Eric Cassell have had to say
about technology. I then examine In re Baby K as a case study of
how law and medicine are presently unable to resist technology.
Finally, I state what is necessary for society, law, and medicine to
recover and maintain our control over technology in general and
medical technology in particular.
II.

JACQUES ELLUL AND TECHNIQUE

Until his death in May of 1994, Jacques Ellul was a theologian,
historian and sociologist of some repute in Europe and to a somewhat more limited extent in the United States. Born in 1912, he
was trained in law, history and sociology, obtaining his doctorate in
law in 1936. He taught until 1980 in the Department of Law and
Economic Sciences at the University of Bordeaux, where his professorship was in history and the sociology of institutions.1 2 His thinking was distinctly dialectical, with its roots in both Barth and
Kierkegaard. Though he once flirted with the Marxist explanation
10. For an illustration of this point see the film AVALON (Baltimore Pictures/
TriStar 1990).

11. Ellul also believed modern technology, because it isolates individuals
from the community, is simultaneously destroying human culture and creating
"networks" that exclude human beings from them. JACQUES ELLUL, THE TECHNOLOGICAL BLUFF 146 (1990).
12. DAVID W. GILL, THE WORD OF GOD IN THE ETHICS OF JACQUES ELLUL 18-25
(1984); Carl Mitcham, Jacques Ellul and His Contribution to Theology, XXXV CROSS
CuRENTs 1 (1985).
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of history, he came to reject its principle that class was at the core of
history, believing instead in the central place of technique. His prolific output of writing is characterized by passion, contradiction and
3
hyperbole.'
The central thesis of The Technological Society, to which Ellul
dedicated so much of his life as a scholar and teacher, can be put
this way: There is in society a powerful force, the phenomenon of
"technique."1 4 A technique is the most rational and efficient manner-the "one best means"-for accomplishing any task,' 5 whether
it be organizing a corporation or communicating through a network of computers. As examples, Ellul cites modern public transportation systems in which people are less important than parcels, 16
hospitals in which patients are but numbers,' 7 television which
retards human communication,' 8 computer games which lead to
addiction to the screen,' 9 and automobiles which fascinate us with
their speed and appearance, drugging us to the reality that they,
too, have helped destroy our communities.
Professor Willem Vanderburg explains Ellul's notion of technique this way:
13. Among the best known of his 24 books in English, in addition to THE
TECHNOLOGICAL SOCIETY, supra note 8, are THE THEOLOGICAL FOUNDATION OF THE
LAW (1960), PROPAGANDA: THE FORMATION OF MEN'S ATrITUDES (1965), THE
POLITICAL ILLUSION (1967), A CRITIQUE OF THE NEW COMMONPLACES (1968), HOPE
IN TIME OF ABANDONMENT (1973), THE NEW DEMONS (1975), THE ETHICS OF FREEDOM (1976), APOCALYPSE: THE BOOK OF REVELATION (1977), THE TECHNOLOGICAL
SYSTEM (1980), and THE TECHNOLOGICAL BLUFF, supra note 11.
14. Ellul states:
When I use the French word technique, normally translated into English as
technology, I do not mean exactly the same thing as the French word
technologie, which is also translated into English as technology. We have to
be meticulous about this simple point of vocabulary. I know that the two
are habitually confused. Etymologically, of course, technologie means a discourse on technique. That is the true meaning of technologie. Now when I
speak of technique [English technology], I am speaking of the technological
phenomenon, the reality of the technological .... I know the difficulty
of this semantic problem in English, for there is only one single word,
technology, to designate both la technique (the concrete thing) and la technologie (the discourse, the teaching of the subject itself). But we must absolutely distinguish between the two ....
[F]or me, la technique is a far
wider concept, referring to efficient methods applicable in all areas
(monetary, economic, athletic, etc.). I would prefer that English retain
the word technique.
JACQUES ELLUL, PERSPECTWES ON OUR AGE 32-33 (1981).
15. ELLUL, supra note 8, at 21.
16. Id. at 5.
17. Id.
18. ELLUL, Supra note 11, at 335.
19. Id. at 364-65.
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Our world has emerged from what Ellul calls a technical intention, the preoccupation of our civilization with
the one best way of doing things. It involves studying
every human activity and using the results to build some
kind of model. By determining under which conditions
the model functions best, one can proceed to restructure
20
that activity to make it as efficient as possible.
By technique, Ellul does not simply mean machines. Technique is a broader category of which the machine is an example.
Technique, says Ellul, "transforms everything it touches into a
machine," the result of which is the creation of "an inhuman
21
atmosphere."
Technique invades every aspect of life. 2 2 In science, we find
that no technique can resist immediate-and generally thought20. Willem H. Vanderburg, Wat an EngineerFound in Ellul, XXXV CROSS CURRENTS 88, 90 (1985). Vanderburg is a member of the faculty of the University of
Toronto and is the editor OfJACQUES ELLUL, PERSPECTIVES ON OUR AGE, supra note
14.
Professor James Grote illustrates the meaning of technique for people:
The heart of technical systems is "efficient ordering." To accomplish
this order, human spontaneity and accidents of nature must be minimized. Nothing can be left to chance-except the direction of the entire
system! To improve economic productivity, industrial techniques are created. These in turn require the systematization of labor to fit the demands of the machine. To integrate human beings with machines
requires new psychological techniques which, in turn, permit the creation of new mechanical techniques that require "new men" to operate
them.
James Grote, Living on Two Levels, XXXV CROSS CURRENTS 77, 79-80 (1985).
21. ELLUL, supra note 8, at 4. Ellul declaims in particular against the cities:
Consider the concentration of our great cities, the slums, the lack of
space, of air, of time, the gloomy streets and the sallow lights that confuse
night and day. Think of our dehumanized factories, our unsatisfied
senses,.., our estrangement from nature .... And the noise, that monster boring into us at every hour of the night without respite .... Life in
such an environment has no meaning.
Id. at 4-5 (sentences appear in different order in text). Ellul sees the city as the
place where technique is most graphically visible, making cities most inhospitable.
Theologian Harvey Cox (author of The Secular City) has taken issue with Ellul on
this point. Harvey Cox, The Ungodly City: A Theological Response to Jacques Ellul, 94
COMMONWEAL 351 (1971).
22. In finding that our own machines have replaced us, Ellul concludes:
We cannot evade technique. It has laid hold of every domain and activity
and reality. Nothing at all is beyond its grasp. It is causa sui. Ordinary
common sense expresses this in the saying that we cannot stop progress.
But this popular phrase has now become the last word in all consideration of these phenomena. When it is a question of dangers, costs, etc., at
the end of the argument scientists and technicians close the debate by
saying that we cannot stop progress.
ELLUL, supra note 11, at 218.
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less-implementation. "Technique produces more technique
23
whether it makes sense or not, whether it is needed or not."
Thus, new car models must be produced each year, with one outdoing the other in marginally useful techniques-a button to tell us
the temperature, another to raise the radio antenna.
In the invention and application of technique, there is no concern for consequences. Here one might think of the unanticipated
effects of the gasoline-powered auto engine with its deadly emissions, its destruction of community life, and the creation of urban
sprawl. In public life, one finds that technique accomplishes the
sterility brought about by the standardization and rationalization of
the social, economic and administrative spheres. Ellul's reference
to hospitals is a too-painful reminder for anyone who has spent
24
time as a patient in a large urban hospital.
Ellul also explains the synergistic effect of the ensemble of
techniques by reference to what he calls the "phenomenon of technique," which he describes as the convergence of systems of technique upon people, causing "operational totalitarianism." The
result, says Ellul, is that "no longer is any part of man free and independent of these techniques." 25 Humanity is enslaved to technique. Both spontaneity and traditional methods alike die. People
find life devoid of meaning.
What accounts for the dominance of technique? According to
Ellul there is a set of interrelated, overlapping characteristics that
creates the power of technique:
0 Automatism. The choice to employ a technique at all, as well
as the choice among techniques, is automatic. There is no contest
between spontaneous activities and technique: technique "automatically eliminates every nontechnical activity or transforms it into
technical activity." 2 6 As for choices among techniques, again there
is never any doubt about the result.- Technique dictates a decision
in favor of "maximum efficiency." 27 Let there be no question here
about the extreme nature of Ellul's meaning. The force of technique operates without the intervention of personal choice, 28 until
23. Id. at 263.
24. These are but examples. Technique exists in every field of modern life:
social, commercial, industrial. We find technique in propaganda, in education, in
the media. For a discussion of the characteristics of technique, see infra notes 2640 and accompanying text.
25. ELLUL, supra note 8, at 391.
26. Id. at 83.
27. Id. at 80.
28. Id.
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29
the entire environment is controlled by technique.
e Self-augmentation. A characteristic related to automatism is
self-augmentation. Like a snowball rolling downhill, technique acquires more and more weight, speed, power and magnitude the
longer it rolls. But there the comparison ends. There is virtually
no bottom of the hill at which technology will come to rest. As Ellul
puts it, " It] echnical progression is of the same nature as the process
of numbering; there is no good ground for halting the progression,
because after each number we can always add 1."30 As technique
grows, the role of people, though always necessary, diminishes to a
point near extinction. One who believes, in the face of this reality,
that people are masters of the process of production is gripped by
32
illusion,3 1 for in reality technique self-generates.
e Monism. The ensemble of all techniques creates the technical phenomenon. This phenomenon has no purpose other than to
progress. It is not controlled by people nor directed by them toward certain moral ends but, rather, has its own technical morality:
the use of technique and the growth of the phenomenon. Continued growth means immediate application of new techniques without examination of the consequences of the uses of the technique
which, in the long run, are usually untoward. The phenomenon is
33
driven by the cardinal principle of technique: efficient ordering.
* Universalism. Technique knows no borders. All cultures,
whether first world or third world, are affected by technique in the
same way. Traditional cultural and economic forms as well as traditional psychological and sociological structures collapse: technique
"dissociates the sociological forms, destroys the moral framework,
desacralizes men and things, explodes social and religious taboos,
and reduces the body social to a collection of individuals." 34 Where
tradition once stood, technique rules. Thus, Ellul is able to say that
"technique cannot be otherwise than totalitarian.... [E]verything
Technique can leave nothing unmust be subordinated to it ....
35
touched in a civilization. Everything is its concern."
* Autonomy. Technique has dispensed with the need for
human creativity. People are mere catalysts for technique, like the
slugs that start slot machines: they "start the operation without par-

29.
30.
31.
32.
33.
34.
35.

Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at
Id. at

84-85.
90.
93.
94.
110.
126.
125.
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ticipating in it."36 People are thus reduced in stature because technique accepts no rules or norms but its own. It has but one
function: "to strip off externals, to bring everything to light, and by
37
rational use to transform everything into means."
The consequences of this characteristic are several. For people, they cannot have liberty in the face of technical autonomy.
People must serve technique, not technique people. Perhaps more
importantly, technique desacralizes the previously mysterious and
then places itself on the throne of the sacred:
Nothing belongs any longer to the realm of the gods
or the supernatural. The individual who lives in the technical milieu knows very well that there is nothing spiritual
anywhere. But man cannot live without the sacred. He
therefore transfers his sense of the sacred to the very thing
which has destroyed its former object: to technique
38

itself.

In a postscript to his description of the characteristics of technique, Ellul charges technique with this final, devastating consequence: "man is no longer able to recognize himself because of the
instruments he employs." 39 Eventually,
[w] ith the final integration of the instinctive and the spiritual by means of... techniques, the edifice of the technical society will be completed. It will not be a universal
concentration camp, for it will be guilty of no atrocity. It
will not seem insane, for everything will be ordered, and
the stains of human passion will be lost amid the chromium gleam. We shall have nothing more to lose, and
nothing to win. Our deepest instincts and our most secret
passions will be analyzed, published, and exploited. We
shall be rewarded with everything our hearts ever desired.
And the supreme luxury of the society of technical necessity will be to grant the bonus of useless revolt and of an
acquiescent smileY°

36. Id. at 135. The "slug starting the slot machine" analogy is Ellul's. Id.
37. Id. at 142.
38. Id. at 143.
39. Id. at 146.
40. Id. at 426-27.
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IN RE BABYK. TECHNOLOGY AS ADDICTION

An anencephalic is not and cannot ever be a sentient human

being. 4 1 Thus, while there is much one can do to an anencephalic
infant, 42 there is nothing anyone can do for such a child. Accordingly, as a general rule, physicians cannot, and do not, treat
anencephalics. How did it come about, nonetheless, that Baby K's
mother could and did demand that a ventilator be attached to her
daughter? How did it come about that the courts ruled for her?
We must recognize, to begin with, the simple fact that the technological means to assist Baby K's breathing existed. Before the
ventilator, physicians could only push breath into a patient's lungs
by using a rather large and clumsy device called the "iron lung."
Technology, however, is never content to stand still; it is self-augmenting. With the invention of the modern mechanical ventilator,
small enough to push around on a cart, the iron lung became inefficient. There was a more efficient means, the ventilator. The
choice to breathe with a new technology became automatic. Why
use no means or less efficient means when very efficient ones were
available? More to the point, why would one not employ the modem technology every time? It is the default position. Because the
technology is there, it is used. There is no evidence that Baby K's
doctors, like so many others who employ medical technology, gave
much thought to, or had much discussion about, whether to employ
the technology. They simply hooked it up as soon as the child was
born. 43 Thus, from the start, there is no choice, no independent
human volition, no reasoned decision-making. The move to tech41. Moreover, as some argue, in certain situations, treatment "is no significant
benefit for the patient, it serves no valid medical goals, it can violate the integrity
of the medical profession, and physicians would be poor stewards to waste scarce
resources on clearly hopeless causes." E. Haavi Morreim, Futilitarianism,Exoticare,
and Coerced Altruism: The ADA Meets its Limits, 25 SETON HALL L. REv. 883, 886-87
(1995).
42. Baby K, for example, had a tracheotomy and a gastrostomy. Ellen J. Flannery, One Advocate's Viewpoint: Conflicts and Tensions in the Baby K Case, 23J.L. MED.
& ETHICS 7 (Spring, 1995).
43. Baby K's mother and her doctors all knew that Baby K would be born with
anencephaly because it had been diagnosed prenatally. According to the attorney
for Contrenia Harrell, Baby K's doctors had agreed prior to her birth to honor her
mother's request to place Baby K on a ventilator at birth. Flannery, supra note 42,
at 7.
One commentator has called the decision of the doctors to administer ventilation a "medical misjudgment.., that may have given the mother the impression
that the doctors would provide medically inappropriate treatment to her child if
she so desired." George J. Annas, Asking the Courts to Set the Standard of Emergency
Care-The Case of Baby K, 330 NEW ENG. J. MED. 1542, 1543 (1994).
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nology is automatic.44
The technology of the ventilator, like all medical technologies,
is also largely independent of human morality as a controlling and
limiting force. The ventilator will work regardless of whether or not
the finger pushing its buttons is connected to a person who has
made a moral judgment about whether the technology should be
employed. The finger could be attached to Adolph Hitler; the fin-.
ger could be attached to Mother Teresa. The technology does not
care. The ventilator has no moral value and no moral opinion. It
can be engaged without the precondition of moral discourse. Indeed, Baby K was put on the ventilator so that the humans involved
could have moral discourse afterwards. There is no morality to technology; there is only monism. The substance of technology is
technology.
Once it is in place (admittedly put there by human agency, but
much like a slug starts a slot machine 45 ), technology needs very little human assistance. Modern ventilators, once they are programmed, operate quite nicely on their own. They are automatically
supplied with oxygen by a tube connected to a wall outlet; this tube
is then connected to a second tube in the patient inserted through
either the patient's nose, mouth or a hole cut in the patient's
throat. Assuming a cooperative and stable patient, the machine,
which regulates the amount of oxygen and air put into the patient
and the timing of the breathing, can then be left running without
the need of intervention for hours at a time. It will breathe on its
own. The ventilator is autonomous.
Even if one were to view this Ellulian interpretation of medical
technology as exaggerating the power of technology as a force to
itself, one would nonetheless have to concede that there is a powerful human weakness for technology. In his essay The Sorcerer's
Broom, 46 Dr. Eric Cassell identifies five human characteristics that
make the use of technology in the medical profession difficult to
resist:
* Wonder. Cassell tells the story of a trip to a Pittsburgh medical center where his hosts show him the center's shiny new cardiac
cath labs. "Why, [he asks,] didn't they take me by somebody's of44. For a gripping account of the difficulty of disentangling technology from
the lives of infants for whom there is no hope of survival, see Darcy Frey, "Does
Anyone Here Think This Baby Can Live?", N.Y. TiMES, July 9, 1995 (Magazine), at 22.
45. For a further discussion of Ellul's "slug" analogy, see supra note 36 and
accompanying text.
46. Eric J. Cassell, The Sorcerer's Broom: Medicine's Rampant Technology, 23 HATINGS CENTER REP. 32 (Nov. - Dec. 1993).
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fice (whispering, so as not to disturb) and say, 'There's one of our
smartest doctors'? Because everybody loves the new and the shiny.
"47

* The lure of the immediate. Unlike patients, technologies give us
hard and fast data, "unmediated by our own reasoning." For example, doctors prefer computer-generated EKG interpretations to patient interviews and examinations. "Science has ruled out of court
the information from values . . .by which we lead our lives ....

One of the advantages of the immediate [by contrast] is that it provides answers-information-when more relevant understanding
would require deeper reasoning and greater involvement from doctors as persons.

' 48

* The lure of the unambiguous. Specific technologies produce
specific results. This reality leads, says Cassell, to a diminishment in
subtle distinctions and a narrowing down of the "field of difference
between what is good and what is bad, so that ultimately one test
49
result is taken to be good and another result bad."

The dislike of uncertainty. It is not unreasonable for humans to
seek certainty. Every profession values it. The difficulty lies in the
fact that while medicine is a very inexact science, physicians are not
trained in the "management of uncertainty ....As a consequence,
they tend to utilize any diagnostic or therapeutic technique that
e

promises to reduce uncertainty. This leads to a ...law of technol-

ogy: whatever technique promises greatest certainty, even if inappropriate, will diminish the use of techniques associated with
greater uncertainty."50
* The lure of power. Doctors are drawn to technology because it
confers power on them. Our society confers status and rank on
people who have control over technologies which gather to themselves space and personnel. Technical power is particularly alluring
because it affords young physicians power that they could not otherwise earn except through years of wisdom-building practice. 51
This set of factors helps explain why the American medical es47.
48.
49.
50.

Id. at 33.
Id. at 34.
Id. at 35.
Id. at 37. Elsewhere Dr. Cassell illustrates his point:
Call to mind an intensive care unit with monitors blinking and beeping and remember how all eyes (even family members') go to the
machine-and away from the patient. It requires effort not to watch the
monitors. Technology-machines, instruments, drug treatments-like
blinkers on a horse, restrict and define and thus simplify the viewpoint.
ERIcJ. CASSELL, THE NATURE OF SUFFERING 22 (1991).

51. Cassell, supra note 46, at 38.
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tablishment is quick on the technology trigger. 52 The effects of
such weakness for technology are enormous. While it is widely recognized that the spiraling cost of medical care can be ascribed in
part to the misuse and overuse of technologies, 53 what is less wellknown is the depersonalizing effect technology has on the physician-patient relationship. Cassell makes the case that for the patient, the technology becomes the doctor and for the doctor, the
technology becomes the patient. For the patient, the doctor fades
in importance except as a technician. For the doctor, the patient is
not the object of study, the patient's interaction with technology is
the object of study. For each, the technological output, "the test
54
results," become the real authority in the case.
52. There are, of course, other factors which some argue contribute to doctors' use of technology. These include the desire to practice defensive medicine
and the ownership by physicians of the diagnostic services to which they refer their
own patients. Defensive Medicine and Medical Malpractice, 14 PEOPLE'S MED. SOC'Y
NEWSL. 1 (Feb. 1995); see MARC A. RODWIN, MEDICINE, MONEY, AND MoRAIas 10
(1993) (discussing financial conflict of interest that is created when physicians refer patients to medical care facilities in which physician has financial interest);
Arnold S. Relman, Dealing with Conflicts of Interest, 313 NEW ENG.J. MED. 749 (1985)
(noting that "practicing physicians now have financial interests in diagnostic laboratories, radiologic imaging centers, walk in clinics, ambulatory surgery centers,
dialysis units, physical therapy centers, and other such facilities"); The High Cost of
Refierral-for-Profit,NATION'S Bus., May, 1992, at 64 (noting that "referral-for-profit" is
one element in an economic incentive system that contributes significantly to skyhigh health care costs).
53. Roger W. Evans, Advanced Medical Technology and Elderly People, in Too OLD
FOR HEALTH CARE? CONTROVERSIES IN MEDICINE, LAw, ECONOMICS AND ETHICS 45
(Robert H. Binstock & Steven G. Post eds., 1991); see also ROBERT H. BLANK, RATIONING MEDICINE 10-11 (1988) (noting that life-extending technology creates policy dilemma because of simultaneous call for both expensive treatment and cost
containment); LARRY R.

CHURCHILL, RATIONING HEALTH CARE IN AMERICA:

PERCEP-

7-8 (1987) (referring to modem technologies as
"halfway technologies" because they are very expensive but not curative or are only
partially curative); CRITICAL ISSUES IN MEDICAL TECHNOLOGY (Barbar J. McNeil &
Ernest G. Cravalho eds., 1982) (especially David Blumenthal et al., Misuse of Technology: A Symptom, Not the Disease, at 163) (noting that health care technology has
been accused of decreasing overall quality of patient life and making medical care
less humane and personal); Woodrow E. Eno, PrivateMarket-Based Health Reform Is
the Answer, KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y, Fall, 1993, at 35, 36 (discussing population's
general dissatisfaction with cost of health care and desire for reform). But see Arnold S. Relman, The Trouble with Rationing, 323 NEW ENG.J. MED. 911, 911 (1990)
(attributing problems of health care system to duplication, waste, and excessive
overhead and not to technology); Anne A. Scitovsky, Medical Care in the Last Twelve
Months of Life: The Relation Between Age, Functional Status and Medical CareExpenditures, 66 MILBANK Q. 640, 658 (1988) (cautioning against rationing of high technology care without further study).
54. Americans are not heard to say, of a sick friend or relative, "her doctor is
trying to determine what's wrong with her," so much as "she's in for tests."
Daniel Callahan puts the point this way: "Because of the focus on technological intervention, the human relationships are often neglected, judged less important, more dispensable, than the necessity of high-quality technical work.
TIONS AND PRINCIPLES OF JUSTICE
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In Baby K,the ventilator took on a much greater presence and
authority than Baby K, her physicians or nurses. From the point of
view of the patient and her mother, Contrenia Harrell's faith was
not in her baby's doctors, who were telling her that based on their
experience and study the bodies of anencephalic babies should not
55
be kept breathing on ventilators. Her faith was in the ventilator.
From the point of view of the physicians involved, their faith was
not initially in the doctor-patient relationship or even their own
medical judgment. Rather, it too, was in the ventilator. Like a bad
friend, by putting Baby K on the ventilator, the hospital introduced
the patient and her mother to the drug of technology. The patient
and her mother quickly became addicted to

56

it.

The inherent dynamic of technology and the attraction of people to technology conspire in Baby K's case to give birth to the "operational totalitarianism" of technology. The ventilator controls
Machines and lab results and scanners become the center of attention; they replace conversation with the patient." DANIEL CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF
LIFE: LWING WITH MORTALITY 41 (1993).
Commenting on the Baby K case, Dr. Michael Grodin of the Program on Medical Ethics at the Boston University School of Medicine and Public Health has been
quoted as saying, "For a baby that has no brain and is born dying, life for just
another minute or another day is not an appropriate goal. It's saying that it's the
technology that has life, not the patient." Greenhouse, supra note 2, at 10-A, col. 4
(emphasis added).
Dr. Arthur R. Kohrman, chair of the bioethics committee of the American
Academy of Pediatrics, states that "The Baby K decision strips away the ability of
physicians to act as moral agents and turns them into instruments of technology."
Linda Greenhouse, Court Order to Treat Baby with PartialBrain Prompts Debate on Costs
and Ethics, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 20, 1994, at 20, col. 1 (emphasis added).
55. This is not what Ms. Harrell actually said, of course. She said that she
wanted her daughter to remain on the ventilator so that God could work a miracle.
Apparently, Ms. Harrell believed that God might cure the baby's anencephaly. Underlying what appeared to be Ms. Harrell's faith in God was in fact an idolatry of
physical life and a lack of faith in things spiritual. For a further discussion of spiritual faith in this context, see infra notes 87-112 and accompanying text.
56. In most cases, it is the patient, the patient's family, or the patient's representative, not the patient's physicians, who wants to release the dying patient from
intrusive medical technology. See, e.g., Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Dep't of
Health, 497 U.S. 261, 261 (1990) (mother and father requested that their daughter's artificial nutrition and hydration be terminated because she was in persistent
vegetative state); In re Quinlan, 355 A.2d 647, 651 (N.J. 1976) (father sought to
discontinue all extraordinary medical procedures that were being used to sustain
his daughter's vital processes, because there was no hope of recovery); In re
Eichner, 420 N.E.2d 64, 67 (N.Y. 1981) (priest representing patient sought to turn
off respirator which was being used to sustain patient after patient suffered brain
damage as complication of surgery). The medical establishment is usually the
party resisting the withdrawal of the technology.
While it is true that it was the hospital in Baby K that wanted to eventually
deprive the baby of the ventilator, it was the same hospital that put the child on the
ventilator in the first instance. Without this initial embrace of the technology, the
mother's insistence on its continued use would not have been possible.
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IV. LAW AS TECHNIQUE

The Fourth Circuit does nothing to challenge the jurisdiction
of technology in its Baby K decision. Why? There are two reasons
this court is capable of doing little else.
To begin with, this court, like most courts, simply mirrors the
norms of the society in which it operates. Why are courts conservative in this way? The answer lies in understanding a court's ability
to see that its will is done. The power of a court to enforce its rulings does not grow out of the physical means it has at hand to command enforcement; those means are quite limited. Courts instead
rely heavily on whatever moral capital they have on deposit with the
general public for compliance. To prevent this account from being
overdrawn, a court will issue decisions that require either no, or
very little, of the court's own moral capital. Brown v. Board of Education 8 is the preeminent exception to this rule.5 9
Baby K is no Brown. Society is addicted to medical technologies. 60 Ruling against the wishes of Baby K's mother would have
meant requiring society to give up its technological fix. Mirroring
society at large, the Fourth Circuit did not have the moral resources
with which it could free society, Baby K's mother, or itself from dependence on technology.
The second reason the Fourth Circuit did nothing to challenge
the rule of medical technology is that the court itself is a captive of
technique-in this case,judicial technique. Ajudicial decision that
'is pure technique is one that appeals to its authors for its lack of
ambiguity, contains the promise of certainty, and is automatic, autonomous, and monistic. In re Baby K reflects all these. As such, the
opinion is the perfect instrument for reinforcing the ascendancy of
medical technology and manic aggressive medicine.
Prior to the passage of the Emergency Medical Treatment and
57. ELLUL, supra note 8, at 391.

58. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
59. What made Brown so remarkable from this perspective was that it went
against the grain of established norms in ordering desegregation of the nation's
schools. On occasion, troops were required to enforce this constitutional mandate. Perhaps the most well-known example of the use of force occurred in Little
Rock, Arkansas when President Dwight Eisenhower called in the 101st Airborne
Division to safeguard the rights of nine black children desirous of attending an all-

white high school. See TAYLOR

BRANCH, PARTING THE WATERS

222-24 (1988).

60. See Daniel Callahan's description of "technological monism" in
CALLAHAN, THE TROUBLED DREAM OF LIFE

DANIEL

67-69 (1993).
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Active Labor Act of 1986 (EMTALA), 61 hospitals engaged in, and
were widely criticized for, a practice known as "dumping. '6 2 Dumping occurs when a hospital, presented with an uninsured and impecunious patient in an emergency condition, refuses to treat the
patient, sending the patient home or to another facility, 63 typically
a public or religiously-affiliated hospital. 64 The results of dumping
were predictable: the conditions of many patients suffered as a result of the delay in their care. Some of these patients, in fact,
died. 65 EMTALA was enacted for one clear purpose: to prevent
dumping. 66 Through EMTALA, Congress intended to stop dump61. Act of April 7, 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-272, Title IX, § 9121, 100 Stat. 164
(codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd (1988 & Supp. IV 1993)).
62. See Emily Friedman, Special Report-The Dumping Dilemma: Finding What's
Fair,HOSPITALS, Sept. 16, 1982, at 75, and articles cited therein.
63. Patient Dumping After Cobra: Assessing the Incidence and the Perspectives of
Health Care Professionals,Office of Inspector General, No. OAI-12-88-00830, [Sept.
1988 - Apr. 1989 Transfer Binder] Medicare & Medicaid Guide (CCH) 37,580, at
18,986 (Dec. 12, 1988).
64. Emily Freidman, Special Report-The "Dumping"Dilemma: The Poor Are Always with Some of Us, HOSPITALS, Sept. 1, 1982, at 51, 52.
65. See Karen I. Treiger, Note, Preventing PatientDumping: Sharpening the Cobra's Fangs, 61 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1186, 1886 (1986) (providing examples of results of
dumping); Friedman, supra note 64, at 51, 56 (discussing problems associated with
dumping).
66. The legislative history of EMTALA, part of the COBRA of 1986, makes the
purpose of EMTALA unquestionably clear:
In recent years there has been a growing concern about the provision of adequate emergency room medical services to individuals who
seek care, particularly as to the indigent and uninsured. Although at
least 22 states have enacted statutes or issued regulations requiring the
provision of limited medical services whenever an emergency situation
exists, and despite the fact that many state court rulings impose a common law duty on doctors and hospitals to provide emergency care, some
are convinced that the problem needs to be addressed by federal
sanctions.
As a result of this concern, the Ways and Means Committee reported
§ 124 of H.R. 3128 (new § 1867 of title 42). This section requires a hospital which has a Medicare Provider Agreement and which operates an
emergency department to provide an appropriate medical screening of
any individual for whom a request for treatment is made. The purpose of
this screening is to determine if an emergency medical condition exists
or if the patient is in active labor. If the hospital determines that either
condition exists, the hospital must provide further treatment to stabilize
the individual or, if it determines to transfer the individual to another
facility, it must properly complete this transfer.
H.R. REP. No. 241, 99th Cong., 2d Sess. 5, pt. 3, reprinted in 1986 U.S.C.C.A.N. 72627.
The courts have had no difficulty accepting the prevention of dumping as the
purpose of EMTALA. See, e.g., Tolton v. American Biodyne, 48 F.3d 937, 943 (6th
Cir. 1995) (noting purpose of EMTAIA was prevention of dumping); Vickers v.
Nash Gen. Hosp., Inc., 875 F. Supp. 313, 316 (E.D.N.C. 1995) (same); Anadumaka
v. Edgewater Operating Co., 823 F. Supp 507, 510 (N.D. 111. 1993) (same);
Carodenuto v. N.Y. City Health & Hosp. Corp., 593 N.Y.S.2d 442, 445 (Sup. Ct.
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ing by requiring hospitals that accepted Medicare patients (1) to
offer patients who arrive at the hospital "an appropriate medical
screening examination ... to determine whether or not an emergency medical condition... exists"; and (2) to provide the medical
treatment "required to stabilize the medical condition" or to transfer the individual elsewhere if the benefits of a transfer outweigh
67
the risks.
The fact with which the Fourth Circuit could never seem to
68
come to grips was that the Baby K case was not a dumping case.
There was never any question that there would be third-party payment.69 Indeed, Baby K's hospital bill, totalling nearly $250,000,
1992) (same). Even the Baby K court recognizes the purpose (and then ignores
it). See In re Baby K, 16 F.3d 590, 593 (4th Cir. 1994) ("Congress enacted EMTALA
in response to its 'concern that hospitals were dumping patients [who were] unable to pay.' ").
67. 42 U.S.C. § 1395dd(a)-(c) (1988 & Supp. IV 1993). For a critical view of
EMTALA, see Judith L. Dobbertin, Note, EliminatingPatientDumping: A Proposalfor
Model Legislation, 28 VAL. U. L. Rtv. 291, 314 (1993) (discussing EMTALA).
68. A fact recognized by the dissent. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 598. Strangely
enough, in an earlier EMTALA case, the Fourth Circuit specifically recognized the
purpose of EMTALA as a factor in its decision not to extend its protection to a
plaintiff seeking damages for an EMTALA violation. See Baber v. Hospital Corp. of
Am., 977 F.2d 872, 884 (4th Cir. 1992) (declining to extend EMTALA beyond
plain language).
Supporters of the Baby K decision (and others) attempt to deflect the criticism
that the court ignored the legislative history of EMTALA by saying, in part, that the
clear language of EMTALA has left courts considering this question with no choice
but to interpret EMTALA as applying to all patients, not simply to those whose less
than standard treatment is motivated by economic concerns. See, e.g., Pamela K.
Epps, Note, In Defense of the Masses-An Interpretationof the Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act: In Re Baby K, 28 CREIGHTON L. REv. 1209, 1237 (June
1995) (supporting court's uses of plain language in Baby K decision); MaryJ. Fell,
Comment, The Emergency Medical Treatment and Active Labor Act of 1986: Providing
Protectionfrom Discriminationin Access to Emergency Medical Care,43 CATH. U. L. REv.
607, 624 (1994) (advocating use of plain language of EMTALA over legislative
history). But see Thomas L. Stricker, Jr., Note, The Emergency Medical Treatment and
Active Labor Act: Denial of Medical Care Because of Improper Economic Motives, 67 NOTRE DAME L. REv. 1121, 1130 n.40 (1992) (citing authorities arguing EMTALA
designed to protect against denial of medical care for economic reasons). This
criticism misses the point. Congress effectuates the purpose of EMTALA when it
requires that hospitals screen and treat all patients. By requiring that all be
screened and treated, Congress puts the poor and uninsured on a par with all
others while simultaneously making it administratively simple for hospitals to follow EMTALA. The purpose of EMTALA is not served, however, by requiring that a
hospital give treatment to a patient under EMTALA that it never gives to any other
similarly situated patient.
69. The hospital correctly asserted that money was never the issue. All Baby
K's bills, nearly $500,000 in total, were paid by either Kaiser Permanente (Ms. Harrell's health maintenance organization) or Medicaid. Marylou Tousignant & William Miller, Death of Baby 'K' Leaves a Legacy of Legal Precedents,WASH. POST, Apr. 7,
1995, at B3. Kaiser paid $410,000. Tousignant & Miller, supra note 6, at Al.
Whether expending such an amount-or any amount-on medically futile care
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was paid in full. 70
Despite the well-publicized outcry over dumping that led to the
enactment of EMTALA and despite the court's own admission that
EMTALA was enacted to prevent dumping, 71 the argument structure of the majority opinion in Baby K appears to have been
designed by a literalist, textualist court that had no use for the legislative history that makes EMTALA's purpose crystal clear. The argument structure is as follows:
1. There is a federal statute called EMTALA.
2. It requires that hospitals provide stabilizing care to all
patients who present with emergency medical
conditions.
3. Fairfax Hospital 72 is a hospital.
4. Respiratory distress is an emergency medical
condition.
5. Baby K presented with respiratory distress at Fairfax
Hospital.
6. A ventilator can stabilize a patient with respiratory
distress.
7. Fairfax must put Baby K on the ventilator.
All this business of applying the statute takes place in only two
paragraphs, the second of which concludes that "[i]n sum, a
straightforward application of the statute obligates the Hospital to
provide respiratory support to Baby K when she arrives at the emergency department of the Hospital in respiratory distress and treatment is requested on her behalf. '73 The process is automatic and
the opinion is autonomous; the court is just the slug that starts the
statute and facts in the process of writing their own opinion. The
decision is arrived at through a technical reading of the words of
the statute and a mechanical application of it to the facts. In fact
the court nearly says as much: " [w] hen a statute is clear and unam74
biguous, we must apply its terms as written."
for one individual is consistent with principles of distributive justice is the subject
of another paper.
70. Tousignant & Miller, supra note 69, at B3.
71. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 593.
72. Because the parties desired anonymity, neither the hospital nor Baby K
and her mother were identified in the Baby K opinion. The hospital was later
identified in the media. See Greenhouse, supra note 2, at A10 (identifying hospital
as Fairfax Hospital in Falls Church, Virginia).
73. Baby X 16 F.3d at 594-95.
74. Id. at 596 (quoting Baber v. Hospital Corp. of Am., 977 F.2d 872, 878 (4th
Cir. 1992)).
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In the remainder of its opinion, the court rejects the four arguments of the hospital as to why it should not be required to provide
ventilation to Baby K. The court's response to these arguments
constitutes an effort to limit the discussion, insofar as possible, to
the text of EMTALA and therefore keep the opinion on technical
grounds.
The hospital's first argument is that EMTALA only requires
that emergency patients presenting with the same condition be
treated in the same manner. In other words, as long as the Hospital
treats Baby K in the same way it treats all anencephalic babies, it
would not be liable for violating EMTALA. The court rejects this
argument by stating that if the hospital's position were correct, the
hospital "could provide any level of treatment to Baby K, including
a level of treatment that would allow her condition to materially
deteriorate, so long as the care she was provided was consistent with
the care provided to other individuals." 75 This language implies
that in some instances anencephalics in fact receive more than
comfort care or that, EMTALA aside, they should receive more
than comfort care. The reality is, according to the chair of the
American Academy of Pediatrics ethics committee, that "[t] here is
not a physician in the country who thinks you ought to treat
anencephalics." 76 The court chose, however, to ignore this extraEMTALA reality.
In further defense of its position, the court quotes an earlier
Fourth Circuit EMTALA decision, Baber v. Hospital Corp. of America,
in which the court stated that "hospitals could theoretically avoid
liability by providing cursory and substandard screenings to all patients." 77 This fanciful reasoning also efficiently restricts itself to
the closed system of EMTALA law. What is ignored by the court is
simply the entire body of malpractice law. Hospitals which provide
only "cursory and substandard screenings to all patients" will be successfully sued by patients injured as a result of such screening. To
think that a hospital's risk manager would permit across-the-board
"cursory and substandard screenings" is to have an incomplete and
unrealistic understanding of the legal world.
The second argument advanced by the hospital was that it was
not the intent of EMTALA to force doctors to go outside the prevailing standard of care. The heart of the court's response is found
75. Id. at 595.
76. Greenhouse, supra note 54, at 20 (quoting Dr. Arthur F. Kohrman, chairman of committee on bioethics of American Academy of Pediatrics).
77. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 595 (quoting Baber, 977 F.2d at 879 n.7).
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in its statement that "[w] e recognize the dilemma facing physicians
who are requested to provide treatment they consider morally and
ethically inappropriate, but we cannot ignore the plain language of
the statute because to do so would 'transcend our judicial
function.' "78
Translated, the court is saying: "[I] t is absurd to think that in
preventing doctors and hospitals from dumping patients, the Congress intended to require doctors to treat patients whom they are
not dumping in ethically and morally inappropriate ways. We are
not permitted, however, to exercise our reason to reach this conclusion." Again, the universe of law is the world of EMTALA law. The
use of reason would create inefficiency in that the court would have
to take the time and expend the energy to reason from the purpose
of the legislation through the facts of this case to a just result.
The hospital's third argument, that Virginia law79 permits physicians to avoid that which is medically or ethically inappropriate,
fared no better. The court essentially had two responses: (1) state
law must give way to federal law when a valid " 'act of Congress,
fairly interpreted, is in actual conflict with the law of the state' "80;
and (2) EMTALA does not include exceptions for medically and
ethically inappropriate treatment. 81 Once again, this court cannot
get beyond the bounds of the EMTALA text. To accept the court's
reasoning here, one must be prepared to first accept the proposition that the statutes are in conflict. EMTALA, however, is silent
about ethics and morals. Then, one must accept the proposition
that Congress either (1) actually intended to have physicians engage in unethical and immoral practices in order to carry out EMTALA or (2) the Congress never thought about the issue. In either
case, it is patently ridiculous to read the ethical and moral standards of doctors out of a statute. Doing so, however, keeps the
court's decision from moving into an area that requires more than
just the ability to read.
Finally, the hospital argued that EMTALA only applies to pa78. Id. at 596 (quoting Iselin v. United States, 270 U.S. 245, 250-51 (1926);
Baber, 977 F.2d at 844).
79. The hospital relied on § 54.1-2990 of the Virginia Health Care Decisions
Act, which provides that "[n]othing in this article shall be construed to require a
physician to prescribe or render medical treatment to a patient that the physician
determines to be medically or ethically inappropriate." VA. CODE ANN. § 54.1-2990
(Michie 1994).
80. Baby K, 16 F.3d at 597 (quoting Savage v. Jones, 225 U.S. 501, 533,
(1912)).
81. The court also noted that EMTALA did not seem to apply to infants. Id.
at 597 n.10.
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tients being transferred from the hospital in an unstable condition.
While this is the hospital's weakest argument, the court's handling
of it reveals much. The court resorts to interpreting the intent of
Congress! But it does so in a peculiar way. 82 It baldly states that the
hospital's interpretation was not the one intended by Congresswithout citing as authority a single word of legislative history or offering any textual analysis.8 3 Rather the court cites two cases from
other circuits, neither of which cites any legislative history for the
point for which the Baby K court cites them. 84 The result in Baby K
is a conclusory statement with no authority and no reasoned argu-

ment to support it. Surely, this is the most efficient way of all for
reaching decisions.
What is the net effect of the court's rejection of the hospital's
four arguments and its earlier embrace of the position that the statute's plain terms speak for themselves? The net effect is that the
court has transformed the physician into a technique. He or she must
cast aside all concern for morality and for ethics and connect ventilators to anencephalic babies. He or she must cast aside any use of
professional judgment as to what procedures are medically indicated and which are medically futile. The physician is simply an
unintelligent slug who starts the machine running.
Baby K gives us this result because the court embraces an approach to law-making that guarantees the security of certainty and
avoids the discomfort of ambiguity. Certainty and clarity would be
threatened if the opinion were to take seriously the question of
whether the purpose of EMTALA is fulfilled in this case by requiring
the ventilation of an anencephalic baby. While the opinion acknowledges the purpose of EMTALA, the monistic nature of this
technical opinion prevents the court from doing more than saying
"we cannot ignore the plain language of the statute." 85 To discuss
the human issues is all too difficult for this court. A technical opinion, by contrast, allows the judges in the majority to remove themselves from responsibility. The court in effect says: "We have no
role in the decision as to whether this child should be allowed the
82. "The use of the word 'transfer' to describe the duty of the hospital to
provide stabilizing treatment evinces a Congressional intent to require stabilization
prior to discharge or that treatment necessary to prevent material deterioration of
the patient's condition during transfer." Id. at 597-98.
83. Id. at 598.
84. Id. (citing Thornton v. Southwest Detroit Hosp., 895 F.2d 1131, 1134 (6th
Cir. 1990); Burditt v. United States Dep't of Health & Human Servs., 934 F.2d
1362, 1368 (5th Cir. 1991)).
85. Id. at 596.
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death that is hers; we are apart from this decision. We can do no
more or less than let the statute's words and the facts work their
way. We do not prescribe this ritual. We simply stand to the side
86
while it unfolds."
The Baby K opinion is thus technique inside technique. In enforcing the regime of medical technique through legal technique,
it is part of the operational totalitarianism of which Ellul warned.
But should we expect anything more from this or most other courts
inasmuch as courts generally reflect the views of the societies of
which they are a part?
V.

DEFEATING DEATH

We should not-but for an important reason in addition to
those already discussed. There is about in the land, and at work in
Baby K, a powerful factor without mention of which any analysis of
the case and of medical technology would be incomplete. Baby K's
mother, like so many of us are wont to do, had made a god of physical life. Ostensibly, she professed her faith in a different god, the
God of Christianity. Indeed the trial judge wrote of Ms. Harrell
that she "believes God, and not other humans, should decide the moment of
her daughter'sdeath."87 Ms. Harrell, however, was apparently blind to
the reality that by insisting on continued ventilation for her dying
daughter she was wrestling with God for control over the time of
this child's death.
In the context of this case, God for Ms. Harrell was not a spiritual God who transcends the boundaries of life and death, but
rather immediate physical life. The continued physical life of her
child was the supreme value in her world. Technology was the
priest that would negotiate her child's journey down the dark,
death-threatening paths she must take and bring her out into the
sunshine of continued physical life. With the intercession of this
priest, she expected that her child would live on and on.8 8
In this, Contrenia Harrell is not an aberration. She is the per86. "It is beyond the limits of our judicial function to address the moral or
ethical propriety of providing emergency stabilizing medical treatment to
anencephalic infants." Id. at 598. By contrast, the dissent takes responsibility for
Contrenia Harrell's daughter and for the law that will control her fate. The dissent speaks clearly and forcefully about the purpose of the statute and its application in this case. Id. at 599 (Sprouse, J., dissenting) (discussing purpose of
EMTALA).
87. In re Baby K, 832 F. Supp. 1022, 1026 (E.D. Va. 1993) (emphasis added).

88. Ms. Harrell believed that her daughter would one day be normal. Tousignant & Miller, supra note 6, at Al.
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fect reflection of modern American society and its reliance on modem, technical American medicine. In our modem-technical
culture people are not supposed to die. For every disease there
should be a cure, for every problem an answer. The goal is to defeat death-any death, all death, every death. The purpose of technique, after all, is to exert control over inefficient natural and other
forces. Just as we conquered smallpox, we are intent on conquering heart disease. After we conquer heart disease, we will conquer
cancer. After we conquer cancer, we will conquer Alzheimers. We
are to live forever.8 9 This is the illusion to which technique has
brought us.
VI.

A HUMAN

RESPONSE TO TECHNIQUE: THE ROLE OF THE
TRANSCENDENT

For Ellul, technology in modern life constitutes a closed system
that incorporates and dominates everything around it. It knows no
boundaries as it negates the meaning of the individual and suppresses the value of culture and tradition. Indeed, the purposes of
existence itself "gradually seem effaced by the predominance of
means. Technology is the extreme development of means." 90
Technology even attempts to consume that which is uniquely
human: "In growing, technique requires that human values be in
exact accordance with technological development and that social
structures develop purely in terms of technology. This . .. shows
that nothing in society remains intact once technique begins to
penetrate." 9 1 In keeping with the tension of dialectical reasoning,
Ellul posits that because that which is within technique inevitably
becomes technique, only a force that stands outside of technique
can stand against technique. Ellul identifies this force as the tran92
scendent, that which is "outside and cannot be assimilated."
Although the transcendent exists in a dimension different from the
"horizontal" dimension on which we operate in our blindness, 93 the
89. Daniel Callahan, an eloquent spokesman for this view, argues that there is
a strange moral logic that has brought us to this point:
The scientific imperative of progress, part of the idea of medical science, is broadened to include a moral imperative: if we do not pursue the
conquest of disease, we are open to moral blame. People will die who
need not die. If we do not use our newly available technologies to save
lives, we can be held accountable for the loss of those lives.
CALLAHAN,

supra note 54, at 61.

90. ELLUL, supra note 14, at 50.
91. Id. at 42.
92. JACQUES ELLUL, WHAT I BELIEVE 183 (1989).
93. Id. at 182.
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transcendent is also "the presupposition without which there can be
94
no concept of anything external to modern technique."
The importance of the transcendent cannot be overstated. Ellul says:
If hope is still possible, if there is the possibility of
humanity continuing, if there is any meaning in life, if
there is an outcome other than suicide, if there is a love
that is not integrated into technique, if there is a truth
that is not useful to the system, if there is at least a taste, a
passion, a desire for freedom, and a hypothesis of freedom, then we have to realize that these can have their basis only in the transcendent .... 95
In pre-modern times, humanity found the transcendent in the
gods of nature. These, however, were but a mirror on the natural
world. 96 A God who was truly transcendent, however, would be limited neither by the natural world nor by history. Moreover, a
transcendent God would be free from humanity's horizontal perspective. Ellul finds the transcendent, so understood, in the God of
Israel, 97 because such a God is "not in the least coincident with the
technological environment," indeed is "not the product (even a
product necessary and indispensable to human survival) of the
human heart or human thought."9 8 Ellul also finds the presence of
the transcendent in Jesus Christ through whom the transcendent
intervenes in human history and breaks through technique to
humanity. 99
However one defines the transcendent and wherever one finds
it, it is clear that to break the hold of medical technology, patients,
patients' families and physicians must be able to discuss, and in
some instances call upon, a faith in the transcendent. Only such a
faith will permit them to see beyond the God they have made of
mere physical existence to some greater reality. Faith in the transcendent will inevitably result in patients and their families recognizing the imposition of medical technology in hopeless end-of-life
situations as a threat to their most cherished beliefs, not an aid to
them. Consider, for example, those cases in which the patient and
94. Id. at 183.
95. Id. at 182.
96. Id. at 184.

97. Id.
98. Id.
99. ELLUL, supra note 14, at 100-02.
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the patient's family hold to a belief in the existence of a soul.
When the condition of such a patient is terminal, belief in the soul
does not merely make withdrawal of futile life support technologies
tolerable, it can actually bring a certain comfort and a measure of
healing to the patient and the family. 100
The painful fact is, however, that our culture, with its laissezfaire attitude toward the spiritual life, is an overly secular culture. A
culture without values that transcend the material world is a culture
whose law and medicine cannot resist technique. 10 1 In particular,
there is not sufficient public discourse on the transcendent to
authorize and make comfortable private discussions about the transcendent between and among physicians, their patients and
patients' families. Rather, ours is a culture in which it is considered
awkward, embarrassing, and even invasive to speak of the
transcendent.
A colleague, for example, tells of an oncologist who feels it is
not acceptable to raise spiritual matters with patients directly. Instead, he finds himself forced to send indirect signals to his patients
that, if they want to talk about the spiritual, he is interested in the
subject. (At the end of the first patient-doctor meeting, he sends
the patient on his or her way with the remark, "See you next week.
You'll be in my prayers.") The caution this physician exercises
arises from the nature of our public life which excludes from public
discussion serious talk of the spiritual. Indeed most physicians feel
so awkward about the spiritual that they would not take even the
small step this oncologist takes.
Why does our public environment keep the spiritual life off the
agenda? The answer lies in part in the moral and political atmosphere created by a misapprehension of the doctrine of separation
of church and state. Properly understood, this doctrine serves us
well; by taking government out of religious discourse, it leaves room
for all to follow their own individual religious consciences. Improperly understood, however, it harms us when it contributes to a cul100. I do not mean to advocate faith in the transcendent as a medicine with
which clever and unethical physicians can drug naive and uneducated patients and
their families into accepting whatever decisions the doctor wishes to make about
the patient's care.
101. A corrosive effect of technology is to break down societies in favor of
individuals. Put another way, technology individuates. For example, cars take people out of mass transit and individuate them by putting them in individual vehicles.
Computers take bank customers out of the bank lobby and individuate them by
permitting electronic banking. Consumers of news can access it not from a newspaper carrier or a newsstand, but from a database. This process destroys the commons, creating an even greater problem with the lack of tradition and culture.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

25

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 2

1390

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 1365

tural understanding that discourse about religion is somehow
embarrassing to the speaker, coercive to the listener or invasive of
the privacy of others.10 2 Thus legitimate public religious discourse
is constricted. 10 3 Of late, however, the United States Supreme
Court and the President have displayed a renewed sensitivity to this
distinction. While the Court has, properly enough, done nothing
to change its rulings that involuntary prayer in the public schools is
a violation of the Establishment Clause, 104 it has prevented school
authorities from banning constitutionally permissible religious exercises. For example, in Westside Community Board of Education v.
Mergens,10 5 the court held that high school students could not be
banned from having meetings of their religious clubs on school
property after-hours when other clubs, also unconnected to the curriculum, were permitted access. 10 6 In Lamb's Chapel v. Center
Moriches Union Free School District,10 7 the Court held that when a
school which permits groups to use its facilities, denies after-hours
use of its building to a church because it desires to publicly screen a
religious film on family issues, it violates the free speech rights of
102. No more eloquent exposition of this point has been made than STEPHEN
L. CARTER, THE CULTURE OF DISBELIEF:

How AMERICAN LAW AND POLITICS TRIVIAL-

IZE RELIGIOUS DEVOTION (1993). Professor Carter states that "[i] n our sensible zeal
to keep religion from dominating our politics, we have created a political and legal
culture that presses the religiously faithful to be other than themselves, to act publicly, and 'sometimes privately as well, as though their faith does not matter to
them." Id. at 3.
Carter's views have been applauded by many and attacked by some. See W.
Burlette Carter, Can This CultureBe Saved? Another Affirmative Action Baby Reflects on
Religious Freedom, 95 COLUM. L. REv. 473 (1995) (criticizing Carter's approach);
Sanford Levinson, The Multicultures of Belief and Disbelief, 92 MICH. L. REv. 1873
(1994) (discussing Carter's views); see also MICHAELJ. PERRY, LOVE AND POWER: THE
ROLE OF RELIGION AND MORALITY IN AMERICAN SOCIETY (1991) (discussing relationship of religious morality to politics in society).
103. A wonderful example comes from William F. Baker, President and CEO
of Thirteen/WNET, a highly-regarded public television station in New York City
whose many programs are broadcast nationwide. This is the story he tells:
I [sat in the offices of WNET], talking to a number of very sophisticated people and suggested that perhaps we do a series on religion, and
one of the producers with seniority looked at me and said, "But, Bill, you
know, the separation of church and state, it's illegal for us to do a religious program." And that was in the hallowed halls of public television.
Religion and the Media: Three Forums, COMMONWEAL, Feb. 24, 1995, at 40.
104. Engel v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962). Later, in Abington School District
v. Schempp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963), the Court banned daily, school-sponsored, inclass Bible-reading and recitation of the Lord's Prayer.
105. 496 U.S. 226 (1990).
106. The Court also ruled that the Equal Access Act, 20 U.S.C, §§ 4071-4074
(1994), did not violate the Establishment Clause.
107. 508 U.S. 384 (1993).
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the church.10 8 Earlier in Widmar v. Vincent,10 9 the Court used the
free speech provision of the First Amendment to strike down a state
university regulation banning the student use of school grounds for
'purposes of religious worship or religious teaching.' "110
Similarly, the President has taken the position that just because
prayer in schools is impermissible, that does not mean that reliAs reported by the New
gious discourse cannot take place there.'
York Times, the President is going "out of his way to emphasize the
protection . . .afforded by the First Amendment, noting that the

same clause that bars 'establishment' of a state religion also prohibits the Government's impeding 'the free exercise' of religion, a
11 2
truth he said had been obscured by recent political debate."
There is certainly an ever-present establishment danger that government will engage in impermissible discourse any time religion is
discussed in the public square; but the Court and the President
seem to appreciate that there are equally grave dangers when private individuals are banned from such speech.
Our constitutional jurisprudence, therefore, may yet play a
role in permitting the discussion of the transcendent in the public
square. The academy can make a similar contribution by helping
expand the bounds of what is permissible public discourse. Indeed,
there has already been an encouraging discussion in the academy
of the reasons the spiritual life as a topic is absent from public discourse in America. In 1993, Professor Stephen Carter's book, The
Culture of Disbelief,in which he argued that "we have created a political and legal culture that presses the religiously faithful to be other
than themselves,"' 13 drew widespread attention, including that of
108. "The principle that has emerged from our cases 'is that the First Amendment forbids the government to regulate speech in ways that favor some viewpoints
or ideas at the expense of others.' " Id. at 388 (quoting City Council of L.A. v.
Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S. 789, 804 (1984)). On the heels of Lamb's Chapel,
the Court decided Rosenberger v. University of Virginia, 115 S. Ct. 2510 (1995).
In Rosenberger, a controversial 5-to-4 decision, the Court held that the denial of
university funds to a student group for the purpose of printing the group's religious paper constituted an abridgement of the group's First Amendment speech
rights and that payment of the funds would not constitute the establishment of
religion.
109. 454 U.S. 263 (1981).
110. Id. at 265 (quoting University of Missouri regulations).
111. Todd S. Purdum, PresidentDefends a Placefor Religion in the Schools, N.Y.
TIMES, July 13, 1995, at 1-A.
112. The President also announced that he had "ordered the Government to
distribute national guidelines explaining the wide degree of religious expression
allowed in schools under current law." Id.

113.

CARTER,

supra note 102, at 3.

Published by Villanova University Charles Widger School of Law Digital Repository, 1995

27

Villanova Law Review, Vol. 40, Iss. 5 [1995], Art. 2

1392

VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 40: p. 1365

the President.' 14 Shortly afterwards Professor Warren Nord wrote
11 5
Religion and American Education: Rethinking a National Dilemma.
Professor Nord attacks the warped sense of "neutrality" which educational institutions use to justify the exclusion of the study of religious thought from the public schools, claiming that knowledge of
religion is an essential element of a liberal education. 1 16 Earlier
Professor Michael Perry published Love and Power, in which he defended "religious politics" by which he means "a politics in which
persons with religious convictions about the good or fitting way for
human beings to live their lives, about the 'truly, fully, human' way
to live, rely on such convictions, not only in making political
choices, but in publicly deliberating about and in publicly justifying
those choices." 1' 7 Might this discussion by academics of things spiritual, joined with more toleration, even support for, religious discourse on the public square by the Court and centrist political
leaders, be the first steps in the creation of a culture in which belief
in the transcendent is taken seriously?1 18
VII.

CONCLUSION

These are, at least, hopeful signs that perhaps one day not too
distant, patients, patients' families and physicians might find themselves in a culture open to those who believe that there is a more
important reality than mere physical life. The stage will then be set
for people to throw off the dominion of technology. Perhaps we
will be emboldened to follow Ellul's urging to affirm the "transcendent over against technique" and in so doing embrace a certain
nonconformity.1 19 We will revolt against the attachment of respirators to babies without cerebrums, oppose the insertion of feeding
tubes into patients without hope of consciousness, and rebel against
114. See Thomas L. Shaffer, Review Essay: Stephen Carterand Religion in America,

62 U. GIN. L. REv. 1601 (1994) (book review); id. at 1601 n.2 (indicating President
Clinton's support for book).
115. WARREN A. NORD, RELIGION AND AMERICAN EDUCATION: RETHINKING A
NATIONAL DILEMMA (1995).

116. Id. at 200-03.
117. PERRY, supra note 102, at 36-37. Professor Perry further argues that religious politics do not have to be authoritarian, sectarian, intolerant or fanatical. Id.
at 37.
118. For a different approach to throwing off technology's reign, see Marcia
Angell, After Quinlan: The Dilemma of the Persistent Vegetative State, 330 NEw ENG. J.
MED. 1524, 1525 (recommending establishment of presumption that patients in
persistent vegetative states (and apparently anencephaly) would not want to be
kept alive indefinitely, thus shifting "the burden from those who want to discontinue treatment to those who want to continue it").
119. ELLUL, supra note 92, at 186.
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the administration of chemotherapy to dying patients. Knowing
that freedom is often gained in resistance, we will refuse to worship
at the altar of technique.
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